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SOME PERSPECTIVES ON REVOLUTION 
Thomas B. Grassey 
For many years people in the United 
States argued that the outcome of the 
Vietnam conflict would have critical 
implications for the future of freedom 
everywhere. The familiar argument ran: 
If the Communists were victorious, 
Western security would be weakened; 
but if the Communists were defeated in 
Vietnam, we would have met "The 
Third Challenge," "Wars of Liberation," 
and convinced the enemy that he could 
not succeed in world conquest by 
proxy. 
The insurgency in Vietnam finally 
has reached its conclusion. Perhaps now, 
more than a decade after American 
combat units were introduced to help a 
friendly government deal with an ex-
ternally supported insurgency and 3 
years after those forces were withdrawn 
*This essay is based on a lecture given in 
August 1975 at the Naval Amphibious 
School, Coronado, California. 
under "peace with honor," it is possible 
to see why our counterinsurgency effort 
failed. 
The paragraph has an odd ring to it. 
There is something strange-and'in that 
strangeness we may find at least part of 
the answer to the question, "Why did 
our counterinsurgency efforts fail?" Try 
reading the paragraph again, substituting 
revolution for insurgency and counter-
revolutionary for counterinsurgency. 
What I wish to examine, therefore, is 
not Vietnam but the fundamental con-
ceptual errors of which Vietnam was 
merely a symptom. For if we mis-
conceived the situation, our loss might 
not be as ominous as we had feared; if, 
however, our misconceptions con-
tributed to or even caused our failure, 
we must correct them before they are 
repeated. 
How we define situations, what 
labels we attach to realities, which 
words we use in thinking about the 
problems we face greatly influence our 
judgments and behavior. If we are be-
witched by false labels, we will make 
bad decisions. And one of the most 
disastrous false labels currently in our 
national vocabulary is "counterinsur-
gency." Of course, it is not an acciden-
tal false label; Americans are deeply 
opposed to being "counterrevolution-
aries." So we almost invented this odd 
word and deliberately applied it even to 
places where it was wildly inappropriate 
(the "meat and potatoes" cases of our 
counterinsurgency courses have been 
Vietnam, China, Cuba, Algeria and 
Malaya). Unwilling to think about 
"counterrevolution," we labeled all our 
activities "counterinsurgency" and be-
came literally unable to discriminate 
between an insurgency and a revolution. 
It is time to recall that distinction. 
"Insurgency," a word used mostly in 
international law, is defined as "a revolt 
against a government, not reaching the 
proportion of an organized revolution, 
and not recognized as belligerency." 
Since "insurgency" is defined relative to 
revolution, what is a revolution? 
A revolution may be distinguished 
from a coup d'etat, foreign invasion, 
military seizure of power, rebellion, and 
insurgency by several indicators. The 
most obvious is that a revolution has 
sizable (though not always majority) 
organized popular support. It aims at a 
redistribution of political power, al-
though social, economic and cultural 
changes may accompany this shift. It 
usually involves violence; some writers 
(including Frantz Fanon, Regis Debray 
and Karl Marx) consider violence essen-
tial to a revolution, but they confuse a 
usually necessary tactic with a defini-
tion of the goal. "Nonviolent revolu-
tion" is not a contradiction in terms: 
Gandhi led one such revolution in India, 
and Lenin surprised himself by coming 
close to a nonviolent Bolshevik revolu-
tion in Russia. However, revolutionary 
activities must be illegal or the changes 
in society, no matter how radical, will 
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be the results of a constitutional process 
(Hitler's 1933 accession to power) or a 
successful reform movement (U.S. 
women's suffrage). The truly essential 
element in revolution is the rejection of 
governmental legitimacy: the deliberate 
and explicit denial of the government's 
right to enforce its rules and laws. So a 
revolution is an organized, popularly 
based attempt to alter radically the 
existing political structure, usually by 
violent and always by illegal means. 
Of all the myths about revolutions, 
the most prominent American miscon-
ception is that their cause is material 
deprivation-poverty, hunger, bad 
health and overcrowding. History does 
not support such a thesis, but instead 
offers Jlotable exceptions. In 1958 Cuba 
had a large middle class and one of the 
highest per capit~_ incomes in Latin 
America. It should have been one of the 
least likely candidates for revolution in 
the Western Hemisphere if the "depriva-
tion" thesis were true. Although grind-
ing poverty is endemic to India, that 
country has not experienced a revolu-
tion since achieving independence. The 
Poles and Hungarians had incipient revo-
lutions in 1956 although they enjoyed 
higher standards of living than their 
quiescent bloc neighbors. Historians 
agree that the American Revolution did 
not result from material want. It is true 
that poverty is a prominent feature of 
most societies facing revolution; but the 
difference between correlation and 
causation is one which we Americans 
persistently ignore in justifying foreign 
aid, planning military civic action pro-
grams, sponsoring the Peace Corps, and 
studying revolution. 
Curiously, the notion that material 
deprivation causes revolution is purely 
Marxian. Marx thought his great "dis-
covery" was that economics determines 
the structure and processes of every 
society. 
The general conclusion at 
which I arrived ... may be briefly 
summed up as follows: In the 
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social production which men 
carry on they enter into definite 
relations that are indispensable 
and independent of their will; 
these relations of production cor-
respond to a definite stage of 
development of their material 
powers of production. The sum 
total of these relations constitutes 
the economic structure of society 
-the real foundation, on which 
rise legal and political superstruc-
tures and to which correspond 
definite forms of social conscious-
ness. The mode of production in 
material life determines the gen-
eral character of the social, politi-
cal, and spiritual processes of life. 
It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their existence, 
but, on the contrary, their social 
existence determines their con-
sciousness. At a certain stage 
... the material forces of produc-
tion in society come into conflict 
with the ... property relations 
within which they had been at 
work before .... Then comes the 
period of social revolution.! 
Marx believed that, by its very na-
ture, capitalism must lead to greater and 
greater disparity between the rich few 
and the impoverished masses, with 
worse and worse material exploitation 
of the laboring class. Finally, and in-
evitably, the oppressed will rise in revo-
lution against the world's rich to abolish 
private property and establish the class-
less, Communist society. Although 
Americans often accept and promulgate 
this strictly Marxist idea that poverty, 
hunger and bad living conditions cause 
revolutions, the fact is they do not. 
Conversely, despite our national pre-
occupation with material wealth, revolu-
tions cannot be prevented merely with 
better food,. housing, clothing and 
health care. Marx was wrong, and so is 
this American myth of what causes (or 
prevents) revolution. 
Some social scientists (e.g., 
Durkheim, Lasswell), after considerable 
research, have concluded that the cause 
of revolution is frustration. We en-
counter graphs and tabular charts, 
"curves of rising expectations," mea-
sures of individual discontent and social 
anomie, and useful or obscurant 
theories of cohesion and social break-
down. Brian Crozier begins his book: 
Frustration is the one element 
common to all rebels, whatever 
their aims, political ideals or social 
backgrounds. ... What, then, is 
frustration? For my purpose, it is 
simply the inability to do some-
thing one badly wants to do, 
through circumstances beyond 
one's control. 2 
One may readily agree that a revolu-
tionary is frustrated, but this is not a 
markedly useful distinction since almost 
all human beings are in various ways 
frustrated. Moreover, many of these 
theories are simplistic blanket notions 
that barely cover the heroic dedication 
one finds among revolutionaries. John 
Paul Jones' crew, Washington's Valley 
Forge army, and Nathan Hale were 
"frustrated." Algerians who were 
brutally tortured by French para-
troopers resisted because of "the dis-
parity between goal visualization and 
goal achievement." Ho Chi Minh was a 
revolutionary for 60 years because he 
experienced severe social anomie, and so 
forth. Since social scientists are reluc-
tant to make implicit value judgments 
by using words like "good," "bad," 
"right," and "wrong" (a scientist "ob_ 
serves facts," he does not "make moral 
judgments"), and due to our own pre-
occupation with material wealth, we 
have all but forgotten the classical po-
litical theory upon which America was 
built. 
"The masses of men make revolu-
tion," Aristotle wrote, "under the idea 
that they are unjustly treated.,,3 Jus-
tice, for Aristotle, consisted of treating 
equals alike and unequals differently, 
but in proportion to their relevant 
differences. This supports the idea that 
all men are equal in a fundamental sense 
(the right to be treated justly), yet it 
allows for dissimilar treatment based on 
inequalities among men. We are not 
obliged to hold that justice requires 
treating everyone alike, so that all of us 
must receive identical amounts of food, 
clothing, housing, education, entertain-
ment and honors. But we are required 
to show that some relevant difference 
between persons justifies the privileges, 
benefits and burdens each is assigned. 
Thus a ship's captain is entitled to 
treatment different than a deckhand's 
because of the difference in responsi-
bilities. Even so, this is always propor-
tional, and there are limits beyond 
which the captain-deckhand differen-
tiation cannot be presumed to justify 
extreme disparities in treatment. 
If "the masses of men make revolu-
tion under the idea that they are un-
justly treated," the key question is: 
What do men think is unjust? For 
injustice is not a natural phenomenon 
like rainfall or difference in height; it is 
a human concept, dependent for its 
existence on value judgments made by 
individuals. Feudal serfs who believed 
that God made some men to be poor, 
cold, hungry serfs and other men to be 
rich, warm, well-fed lords saw no in-
justice in their situation. Despite being 
miserable themselves, and aware of their 
baron's luxuries, they did not revolt. 
Our modern world has parallels: with a 
long Brahmin-Parish caste heritage, 
Indian society has tended to accept as 
just great inequalities in the treatment 
of people. Mao Tse-tung wrote that his 
biggest problem in 1928 was getting the 
peasants to realize that something was 
wrong with Chinese society, that some-
thing better was feasible. Fidel Castro's 
main support came not from the peas-
ants but the educated and middle class 
-those who were materially comfort-
able but who felt unjustly excluded 
from a genuine political process. 
A revolutionary situation exists when 
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people feel unjustly treated to a severe 
degree, and not because of poverty, 
frustration or even glaring social in-
equalities. John Adams understood this 
point. He knew that the American 
struggle was not really over taxes or the 
king's policies or various acts of Parlia-
ment. The issue was sovereignty, the 
right in justice of a people to govern 
themselves, and Adams wrote: 
The Revolution was effected 
before the war commenced. The 
Revolution was in the hearts and 
minds of the people .... This radi-
cal change in the principles, 
opinions, sentiments and affec-
tions of the people, was the real 
American Revolution.4 [His 
emphasis.] 
Another myth which we Americans 
have incorporated in our current view of 
revolution is that of the outside agita-
tor. It is true that a revolution requires 
leadership and organization. Someone 
must think "this is unjust"; someone 
must propagandize to convince others 
that there is an attractive and attainable 
alternative to the present-felt injustice; 
and someone must be willing to break 
laws, engage in violence, and risk his 
own safety and security to oppose the 
"oppressor." These roles of thinker, 
propagandist, and activist define revolu-
tionary leadership; they may be filled 
by one man (Lenin) or several (Jeffer-
son, Paine, Washington). But because 
leadership is necessary for a revolution, 
many people mistakenly believe that it 
is sufficient to cause a revolution. This 
is tantamount to arguing that because 
oxygen is necessary for a fire, the 
presence of oxygen will cause a fire. 
Common views found in much of our 
counterinsurgency literature and atti-
tudes are that Lenin, Ho, Fidel, or Mao 
and a small band of conspirators suc-
ceeded in their efforts without genuine 
popular support; that ignorant people 
were duped; that a small faction com-
pelled reluctant support through mass 
terror; or that a skilled propagandist 
70 
whipped a minor gripe into an un-
warranted revolutionary issue. 
The commonly ignored point is that 
no revolution can succeed without at 
least the passive support of a sizable 
segment of the population, support 
which the revolutionaries can gain only 
through governmental indifference, 
stupidity or callousness. Considering the 
resource imbalance between an estab-
lished government and a nascent revolu-
tionary movement, the vulnerability of 
conspirators, the isolation of urban and 
rural guerrillas, and the inherent tenden-
cies of people to obey the law and 
oppose radical change ("All Experience 
hath shown that mankind are more 
disposed to suffer, while Evils are suffer-
able, than to right themselves by 
abolishing the Forms to which they are 
accustomed"s), it is surprising that 
revolutions occur at all. Yet throughout 
history we have heard the weary refrain 
of privileged groups denying the reality 
and legitimacy of anger among the less 
fortunate. Plato and Cicero reported it, 
and it may be found prominently in the 
English Civil War debates and British 
colonial empire discussions, as well as in 
the literature defending American 
slavery. More recently we have heard 
the denial of any genuine problem, the 
same automatic response-"outside agi-
tators"-to civil rights protests, student 
campus violence, urban ghetto riots, and 
military race relations conflicts. 
The myth of the outside agitator is 
an understandable and very human 
response, because those who are 
privileged cannot easily appreciate that 
many people really are terribly angry 
about the way the world is. It is 
difficult to see a situation as unjust 
unless one is the victim. Consequently, 
those who are privileged tend to deny 
that there is injustice and blame the 
turmoil on "outside agitators." Thus, in 
1857, George Fitzhugh wrote: 
We warn the North that every 
one of the leading abolitionists is 
agitating the negro slavery 
question merely as a means to 
attain their ulterior ends ... a sur-
render to Socialism and Commu-
nism-to no private property, no 
church, no law; to free love, free 
lands, free women and free 
children. 6 
That sad blindness of the South's 
leading apologist for slavery existed, 
ironically, six years after Friedrich 
Engels had naively claimed (in the New 
York Daily Tribune): 
The times of that superstition 
which attributed revolutions to 
the ill will of a few agitators have 
long passed away. Everyone 
knows nowadays that wherever 
there is a revolutionary convul-
sion, there must be some social 
want in the background which is 
prevented by outworn institutions 
from satisfying itself. 7 
If "outside agitators" are not blamed 
for causing revolutions, "ignorance" is. 
But as Ted Gurr has noted about this 
explanation: 
Man's resort to political vio-
lence is in part unreasoning, but 
does not occur without reason. 
Ignorance is almost always among 
its causes: sometimes ignorance of 
its consequences by those who 
resort to it, more often ignorance 
by those who create and maintain 
the social conditions that inspire 
it.8 
So what we see in the myth of the 
outside agitator is an attempt by the 
fortunate to explain away the anger of 
those crying "injustice!" by attributing 
it to external provocateurs and ignor-
ance. Woodrow Wilson recognized and 
eloquently criticized such self-delusion: 
Men do not start revolutions in 
a sudden passion .... Revolutions 
do not spring up overnight. Revo-
lutions come from the long sup-
pression of the human spirit. 
Revolutions come because men 
know that they have rights and 
that they are disregarded.9 
Support of the people is the central 
theme of every revolutionary leader and 
theoretician. It is obvious from even the 
most casual perusal of revolutionary 
literature or history that the majority of 
the people must at least passively accept 
the revolutionaries' activities. Trotsky 
learned this in abortive Bolshevik at-
tempts to "inspire" revolutions in 
Berlin, Munich, Hungary, Hamburg, Bul-
garia and Estonia; "Permanent Revolu-
tion" was abandoned. Lin Piao re-
nounced Chinese initiation of revolution 
in other nations, saying: 
The liberation of the masses is 
accomplished by the masses them-
selves-this is a basic principle of 
Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or 
people's war in any country is the 
business of the masses in that 
country and should be carried out 
primarily by their own efforts; 
there is no other way .... Foreign 
aid can play only a supplementary 
role. 1 0 
Che Guevara, Cuba's Trotsky who 
thought that with 50 men he could 
wage a successful revolution anywhere 
in Latin America, brilliantly diagnosed 
his own failure: 
Where a government has come 
into power through some popular 
vote, fraudulent or not, and main-
tains at least an appearance of 
constitutional legality, the guer-
rilla outbreak cannot be promoted 
since the possibilities of peaceful 
struggle have not yet been ex-
hausted . ... This is clearly seen 
by considering the case of bandit 
gangs. They have all the character-
istics of a guerrilla army .... The 
only thing missing is support of 
the people; and, inevitably, those 
gangs are captured and extermi-
nated.11 
A third myth in our American ap-
proach to revolution is the myth of the 
military victory. Because governments 
tend to deny the strength, legitimacy 
and even the existence of revolutionary 
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movements, they postpone reaction 
until the situation has grown quite 
serious. Then military forces are as-
signed to "solve the problem." Admiral 
Zumwalt told a 1974 Tufts University 
audience tha~ as a rear admiral in 1963 
he had written that "our national inter-
est would not be served by becoming 
militarily involved" in Vietnam; his re-
port, he said, was overruled by a Penta-
gon civilian, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg.12 If 
there is any hope at all for the military 
commander to accomplish his mission, 
he must remember the two preceding 
myths and seek a governmental response 
to the causes (the perceived injustices) 
even more than to the symptoms (vio-
lence, political terrorism) of the revolu-
tion. Military professional training incul-
cates an aggressive, "can do," result-
oriented attitude, with "results" almost 
inevitably thought of as quantifiable. 
Performance tends to be judged on 
things we can count: patrols, arrests, 
raids, "pacified hamlets," and casualties. 
Meaningless rules-of-thumb, like "10:1 
(or 15:1) is the magic troops: guerrillas 
ratio for victory," acquire holy auras. It 
is imperative that the commander and 
his subordinates appreciate how little 
these numbers may correlate with mis-
sion accomplishment. No matter how 
good the numbers look, the revolution 
may be succeeding. "My feeling," said 
Marine Corps Commandant Wallace M. 
Greene in 1966, "is that you could kill 
every Vietcong and North Vietnamese 
in South Vietnam and still lose the 
war. ,,13 Strictly speaking, armed force 
is only a temporary shoring device 
which may briefly reestablish social 
order in a time of tumult; it offers the 
government one last chance to alleviate 
the grievances fueling the revolution. It 
is not, per se, a solution. 
The heart of the revolutionaries' 
claim is that they are right, not that 
they are stronger; a successful military 
occupation proves nothing against that 
conviction. If men feel unjustly treated, 
military patrols, curfews, and searches 
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(no matter how polite) will not change 
their opinion. In fact, such measures 
themselves lend plausibility to revo-
lutionary propaganda that the govern-
ment is hostile to and oppressive of 
the people's rights and welfare. Indeed, 
a prime ambition of many revolu-
tionaries is to provoke a harsh military 
crackdown; it bolsters their claims that 
the unjust government will resist by 
force of arms any peaceful reform 
attempt, so a violent revolution is 
necessary. The paradigm of a military 
success/political catastrophe was 
General Massu's ruthless and complete 
annihilation of every known member 
of the Algerian FLN leadership by use 
of martial law, torture and counter-
terrorism. Many Algerians consider 
Massu's military "success" in the 
Casbah the point when their revolution 
for independnece became irreversible 
because an amicable political settle-
ment had been made impossible. Short 
of genocide, there is no military 
solution to a revolutionary situation 
because a revolution is a contest of 
ideas rather than arms, of justice and 
allegiance rather than firepower and 
body counts. We forget these points 
again at our own peril. 
The world's population is today 
approximately 4 billion people. Over-
all, the growth rate is about 2 percent 
per annum Each day, therefore, there 
are nearly 200,000 more human beings 
alive than there were the day before; 
every passing second adds two and a 
quarter persons. This is not births, but 
births minus deaths, or net growth. In 
the time it would take a nuclear task 
force to sail from the United States to 
the Persian Gulf-2 weeks or so at a 
30-knot speed of advance-the world's 
population would have increased by 3 
million people. That is roughly equiva-
lent to the population of Honduras, 
Ireland, Israel, Laos, Lebanon, New 
Zealand, Somalia or Uruguay added to 
the world during transit. If present 
population trends continue, there will 
be twice as many people on the planet 
in 2006 as there were in 1973. 
A second consideration: The wealth 
of the world is unevenly distributed. 
Fewer than a quarter of the world's 
inhabitants possess three-quarters of 
the riches. Two-thirds of the people 
live in "underdeveloped countries"; 
their children under the age of 15 
equal in number the entire populations 
of the world's developed nations. And 
the gap between rich and poor is open-
ing, not closing. A decade ago our per 
capita income was nearly $3,000 while 
the World Bank classified 38 countries 
"very poor" with per capita incomes 
below $100. Discounting inflation 
"growth," our real per capita income is 
projected to reach $4,500 by the end 
of the century; the very poor nations 
will reach $160. 
Third in importance to population 
and the distribution of wealth is the 
continuing worldwide tendency to 
urbanize, Westernize, and communi-
cate. By living in or near a large city, 
by viewing a movie or the village tele-
VlSlon, more and more people of the 
world are seeing glimpses of how 
others live and of what they them-
selves do not have. This is much too 
meager to be called "education" about 
other lands-even "awareness" may 
overstate the case-but it is a glimpse, 
an image, an impression. 
If these trends of population 
growth, economics, and increased com-
munication of images continue, there 
will be greater and greater known dis-
parity between the world's rich and 
poor. "The wretched of the earth" (as 
Fanon called them), increasing in num-
ber three times as fast as the world's 
comfortable people, more and more 
will be seeing glimpses of what they do 
not have. Inevitably, they will recog-
nize the difference between what life is 
like for the fortunate and what it is 
like for them and their children. And 
they will call it unjust. 
So, if Aristotle was right that the 
masses of men make revolution under 
the idea that they are unjustly treated, 
the world must seem to be on the 
verge of a profound revolution. The 
remainder of this century promises 
great political instability in the world, 
numerous periods of tension among 
nations about questions of justice, and 
frequent temptations to use naval or 
military force to achieve national 
objectives. Standing behind our 
nation's actions will be an implicit 
proclamation of what we, as a people, 
value. Particularly important, how the 
United States perceives and reacts to 
revolution will be largely shaped by, 
and will directly affect, those in 
uniform today. 
I think we should reexamine the 
prevalent belief that the world struggle 
is between communism and capitalism, 
with the Communists engaged in an 
international effort against capitalist 
societies. Not since Trotsky's failures 
has the Communist Party been truly 
international. Lenin abandoned Turkish 
and Persian Communists in courting 
both Ataturk and the Shah for border 
adjustments. The Korean and Indo-
nesian parties were expelled from the 
Comintern in 1927 for unauthorized 
revolutionary efforts. Stalin directed the 
Chinese Communists to work with 
Chiang in 1925, which led to Chiang's 
liquidation of most of the CCP leader-
ship. (Mao and Chou barely escaped 
"the great headhunt"-Mao's first wife 
did not.) In 1936 Stalin told the Span-
ish Communists to forget revolution and 
to side with the Republicans. The Ger-
man and Polish Communist parties were 
sacrificed for the 1939 Ribbentrop Pact. 
After the war, Stalin directed the 
French Communists to support de 
Gaulle, the Italians to accept Badoglio 
(despite a strong partisan base for revo-
lution), Tito to agree to a restoration of 
the Yugoslav monarchy, and Mao to 
form a coalition with Chiang. The 
French Communists enraged Ho Chi 
Minh by opposing independence for 
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Indochina during the 1946 elections. 
In fact, the Soviets did very little for 
the Chinese, Algerian, or Cuban revolu-
tionaries during their wars. Gr62k Com-
munists had to rely, uneasily, on Yugo-
slav aid because Stalin gave them virtu-
ally no help. The Cuban Communist 
Party had a comfortable modus vivendi 
with Batista, and when Castro called a 
1958 general strike, the Communist-
controlled unions ignored it. Indeed, the 
Cuban Communist Party had no formal 
contact with Castro's army until a few 
months before Batista fled. 
Among non-Communist countries, 
the Soviet Union has given the greatest 
amounts of aid to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, 
India and Indonesia. In every one of 
these nations, the Communist Party was 
at one time or is now illegal and party 
members have been jailed or executed. 
Such prohibitions and prosecutions have 
not necessarily affected the flow of aid. 
Also, on the whole, Chinese and other 
Communist regimes have given relatively 
little aid to fellow Communist revolu-
tionaries. Finally, Sino-Soviet border 
battles, support of opposing factions in 
Angola, and counteracting policies in 
the Indo-Pakistani conflict, are glaring 
contradictions to the idea of a "United 
Communist Movement." 
The upshot of all this is that "an 
international solidarity of Communists" 
simply does not exist. That concept fails 
to explain Soviet or Chinese foreign 
policy with any rational consistency. 
National self-interest, however, does 
adequately and coherently account for 
Soviet and Chinese decisions; greater 
attention should be paid to national 
priorities than to ideological purity. It 
was neither Dean Acheson nor Dean 
Rusk who warned, "The policy of 
Russia is changeless .... Its methods, its 
tactics, its maneuvers may change, but 
the polar star of its policy-world 
domination-is a fixed star." Karl Marx 
made that observation more than a 
century ago;14 he was, obviously, not 
always wrong. 
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The Russians have noticed that of 
the seven nations which have become 
Communist without Red Army "help," 
three-China, Albania and Yugoslavia-
have proved very unreliable "allies." 
(Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are un-
certain; only Cuba seems steady.) They 
are further annoyed by the fickleness of 
aid recipients such as Egypt, Ghana, 
Syria and Indonesia. The obvious con-
clusion is that military conquest is the 
fail-proof method of gaining reliable 
control of a strategically important area. 
While land-bound border expansion in 
several directions still may be attractive 
to Soviet planners, the new vistas 
opened by a powerful Soviet Navy 
appear at least as dangerous to the West. 
If a Communist revolution were to 
develop in an area of great value to the 
Russians, they might attempt to land 
and sustain a support force-a contin-
gency the U.S. Navy might be tasked 
with preventing.1 5 Our particular con-
cern, then, is not with Communist 
revolutions per se, but rather with 
Soviet military intervention and usurpa-
tion of a revolution for her own na-
tional interest. 
It also is important to note that our 
"counterinsurgency" attitude stems 
from a colossal feat of politicallegerde-
main. At the 1961 World Communist 
Congress, Nikita Khrushchev unilater-
ally declared that all "Third World 
people's wars" were in the interests of, 
and would be supported by, commu-
nism. Two weeks later when John F. 
Kennedy became President, Khrush-
chev's premise was swallowed whole: 
Roger Hilsman, Walt Rostow and Max-
well Taylor launched us into the Green 
Beret Counterinsurgency era. (Years 
later, David Halberstam would write, 
very high Soviet officials told their 
American counterparts that it was all a 
misunderstanding, that the talk was 
aimed at the Chinese for propaganda 
and rhetoric purposes.1 6 ) Misunder-
standing or not, our reaction was a 
mistake, for it simply is not true that all 
Third World revolutionary activity is 
beneficial to the Russians or Chinese. 
Much of it reflects legitimate aspirations 
of people to achieve domestic justice by 
overthrowing colonial, racist or oli-
garchical tyrannies. 
Our "counterinsurgency" attitude 
often has caused, tragically, what it was 
intended to prevent-the growth of anti-
Americanism. "Neocolonialism," for 
instance, essentially is the accusation 
that American foreign policy is pre-
dominantly guided by economic self-
interest, that we support repressive 
regimes to protect our overseas invest-
ments. The use of bribes and kickbacks 
by American corporations; diplomatic 
and military backing of dictatorships in 
return for base rights; CIA interference 
in other nations' political processes; the 
"destabilization" of democratically 
chosen governments which threaten 
American investments; attempted "pre-
judicial terminations" of various foreign 
leaders; police, army and intelligence 
"advisors" to help tyrannical but pro-
Western governments frustrate popular 
uprisings; and covert or overt (as in 
Santo Domingo) American military in-
terventions have been argued to be the 
rule rather than the exception in our 
foreign relations. While a free enterprise 
economic system may prove the best 
way to try to meet the world's burgeon-
ing population needs, it would be fool-
ish to deny that there has been eco-
nomic exploitation of the lesser 
developed nations and that the central 
injustice in most Third World countries 
today is a grossly inequitable distribu-
tion of wealth, for whatever reason. 
Revolutionary movements quite' natu-
rally will be directed against that in-
justice; and, not uncommonly, U.S. 
overseas presence and investments will 
be labeled "colonialist." Further, the 
fact that they are living in misery while 
we experience unprecedented luxury 
strikes many of the world's poor as 
unjust. To them, free enterprise seems a 
license to exploit. But for us to call all 
these revolutions "Communist insurgen-
cies" is to make them what they need 
not be. 
Western political theory holds that 
the purpose of business is profit, the 
purpose of government is justice, and 
the two are not the same. Marxists deny 
this; they contend that government is 
merely an instrument of exploitative 
class oppression. Thus, Marx's grand 
challenge was his claim that the rich of 
the world can only try to become even 
richer. Capitalists may talk about peace, 
freedom and justice, he said-they "may 
even throw the oppressed some meager 
sops to ease their own consciences-but 
the truth of their actions belies their 
protestations: they are economically 
enslaved to place property ahead of 
justice, gain ahead of rights, material 
goods ahead of human dignity. Accord-
ing to Marx, all political decisions, 
democratic notions, lofty declarations 
of brotherhdod, even religious and 
moral principles are subordinate to 
fundamental greed. The rich never will 
voluntarily give up their privileges, never 
peacefully consent to the reallocation of 
wealth which justice requires-this can 
be achieved only by violent revolution. 
Hence, the Manifesto concludes that 
Communist ends "can be attained 
only by the forcible overthrow of all 
existing social conditions. Let the 
ruling classes tremble at a Communist 
revol u tion. The proletarians have 
nothing to lose but their chains. They 
have a world to win. Workers of the 
world, unite!"! 7 
The world's poor, growing in number 
and feeling unjustly treated, will surely 
hear Marx's claim. We, the world's rich 
growing richer, must answer it. What do 
we stand for? How will we use our 
power? What do Americans value-
liberty, or our standard of living? What 
goals do our armed forces serve-justice, 
or profit and privilege? 
Because the Defense Department 
plays so significant a role in shaping our 
foreign policy, considerable astuteness is 
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required of military leaders. Short-term 
expedience must be carefully weighed 
with attention to our long-term national 
values. Policies that imply Marx's eco-
nomic determinism will have to be 
balanced against our heritage from 
Jefferson and Lincoln. While there al-
ways have been evil men who would 
impose their Auschwitzes and Gulags 
worldwide unless deterred by brave men 
in arms, there also are other, more subtle, 
crimes against humanity-surfeit in a sea 
of want, ethnic and religious domina-
tion, various political exclusions-which 
now are awakening revolutions. Those 
who feel such injustices will judge the 
United States by how our armed forces 
are used; so it will not be enough to 
oppose the Gulags and proclaim "free-
dom and liberty" if we support oli-
garchies, dictatorial juntas, and "pro-
Western" tyrannies against revolution. 
But all too often, "counterinsurgency" 
has meant just that. 
Military leaders must be more atten-
tive, then, to the causes of revolution, 
the limited relevance of military power 
to deal with an essentially political 
struggle, and the implications of Ameri-
can support to governments facing revo-
lution. They also should be aware that 
90 percent of mankind is non-White. 
Africans, Asians and Latin Americans-
the whole Third World-form opinions 
about America by seeing how their 
distant relatives-Black, Oriental and 
Hispanic Americans-are treated, espe-
cially in military units deployed over-
seas. If our armed forces deter interna-
tional aggression, if our foreign policy 
recognizes the legitimate grounds of 
many revolutions, and if our national 
experience demonstrates that the 
United States stands for justice and 
human respect as well as material pros-
perity, then we may look hopefully at 
Karl Marx's prediction: "Russia has 
only one opponent: the explosive power 
of democratic ideas, that inborn urge of 
the human race in the direction of 
freedom."! 8 
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